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NOTE
THE INTENTIONAL MURDER AT COMMON
LAW AND UNDER MODERN STATUTES*
The purpose of this note is to make a survey of the intentional
murder statutes, which, n the majority of jurisdictions make inten-
tional murder a statutory offense. These statutes will be analyzed and
compared to the common law offense of intentional murder in an
endeavor to determine whether they are, in the main, a codification
of the common law, or whether they present major deviations from it.
To this end, the note will be divided into two principal parts. The
first will be a brief resume of the common law intentional murder as
it existed at the time the American Colonies were forming their
judicial systems based upon law drawn directly from England.i The
second part of the note will contain a discussion of the various inten-
tonal murder statutes as they exist today with an attempt to relate
them to the common law, and comments on the more prevalent
similarities or discrepancies which appear to exist, together with a
suggested model statute applicable to the crime of intentional murder.
I.
INTENTIONAL MURDER AT COMMON LAW
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen formulated an analysis for murder at
common law which will be very helpful as a basis for a brief survey
of the intentional murder at common law
"Murder is homicide not excused or justified and
with malice aforethought either expressed or implied.
Malice aforethought means any one or more of the fol-
lowing states of mind preceding or co-existing with the act or oms-
sion by which death is caused, and it may exist where that act is
unpremeditated.
(a) An intention to cause the death of, or grevious
bodily harm to, any person, whether such person is the person actually
killed or not."-
This subsection (a) of Stephen's analysis of common law murder
is the description of the state of mind required for the intentional
murder at common law; the subsection breaks down naturally into
* The note by Mr. Creech on p. 441 is a companion note to this one.
'For a full discussion of the development of common law murder, see Perkins,
A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537 (1934); New York
Law Revision Commission Report 533-540 (1937).
-A DIGEsT OF THE CRIMINAL LAw 218 (8th ed. 1947).
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three distinct situations where an intention to kill will be attributed
to an actor causing the death of another. They will be discussed in
turn:
(1) Where there is an express intent to cause the death of the
person killed.
As used in this note, express intent may be evidenced in two ways:
direct express intent or indirect express intent. A description of the
former is the state of mind of one who does an act with the purpose
and design of unlawfully and unjustifiably effecting the death of an-
other thereby In other words, he purposefully and unlawfully uses
fatal means at his disposal toward a definite and desired end, which
is the death of the other.
Due to the severity of punishment and the universal stigma which
accompames the intentional murder, it is understandable that one who
has committed such a crime would generally be exceedingly reticent
to disclose his state of mind to the prosecutor. As a consequence, the
law has been required, as a matter of expediency in many cases, to
infer the express intent to kill from the various circumstances of the
particular case.3 These may take the form of threats of vengeance,
lying in wait,4 or other circumstances showing directly that the actor
entertained an express intent to kill.
To complement the use of direct evidence to cast a light upon the
intent of the criminal, the law may utilize inferences of express intent
from any one of several particular fact situations. Examples of such
indirect express intent are where the killing is accomplished through
the use of a deadly weapon,5 poison,6 or if it is committed in an excep-
tionally cruel and brutal manner, as by torture, 7 the law will proceed
upon the theory that the actor intended the natural and expected con-
sequences of his act," and therefore intended to cause the death. The
same inference arises from the very act of the killing itself, where
there has been no apparent provocation, justification or alleviation.9
This inference was allowed to stand against the defendant at common
law until he could show an adequate explanation of his state of mind
which would rebut the inference of express intent to kill.
The second fact situation to which Stephen's analysis (a) applies is:
3Stevens v. State, 42 Tex. Cr. App. 154, 173, 59 S. W 545, 549 (1900).
'I EAST, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 224 (ed. of 1803).
Grey s Case, J. Kelyng 64, 84 Eng. Rep. 1084.
I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 455 (ed. of 1778).
1] HAWKINSv, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 99 (8th ed. 1824).
Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. 295 (Mass. 1850).
"1 HALF, PLEAS 01 TIE CROWN 455-456 (ed. of 1778).
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(2) Where there is an intent to inflict grevous bodily harm upon
another
This category or division of Stephen's analysis (a) pertains to the
state of mind of the actor when he does not have an express intent
to effect the death of his victim, but rather designs to inflict a grievous
bodily injury upon him.
The early common law did not seem to put emphasis upon the
degree of the bodily harm intended by the actor, and it would appear
that the doing of any bodily harm to another, unlawfully, and resulting
in death, would have constituted the requisite malice.1 However, in
later years the degree of the intended harm began to assume im-
portance.
To constitute the degree of intended grievous bodily harm, less
than death, which is sufficient to establish the state of mind required
for intentional murder, the courts have made use of such expressions
as "grievous mischief," "great bodily harm," or "serious bodily harm.""
It will be apparent to the reader that these descriptions of the degree
of injury intended by the actor are not conclusively helpful, but they
do serve as guides to the court in presenting adequate instructions to
the jury on this matter.
The third category into which Stephen's analysis (a) may be di-
vided is:
(8) Where the intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm upon one
person results in the death, not of the intended victim, but of a third
person.
This situation is generally described by the term "transferred in-
tent." If a man shoots at one person with intent to kill another, or
puts poison in one man's drink intending to kill -him and a stranger
picks up the glass by mistake and dies as a result of drinking it, the
crime attributed to the actor is intentional murder, notwithstanding
the fact that actually he had no intent to cause that person's death."'
The basis for this doctrine seems to be that as the actor had the
state of mind requisite for intentional murder, and by his act he did
cause another's death, the law will transfer the intent to kill from the
proposed victim to the person actually killed, thereby making the in-
tentional murder complete.
1o I HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 451 (ed. of 1778).
11Perkins, A Re-examnnation of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537,
558-554 (1934).
'Johnson v. State, 92 Ga. 36, 17 S. E. 974 (1893); 1 HALE. Pi.AS o THL CROWN
466 (ed. of 1778).
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From the preceding discussion concerning the nature of the com-
mon law intentional murder the following summary may be drawn.
It resulted from an unlawful killing with "malice aforethought." This
malice aforethought was a nebulous term which was required for all
common law murder, and was used to describe the state of mind of
an actor who had committed murder. In the case of the intentional
murder, it was satisfied by any one of the following situations:
(1) Where there was an express intent to cause the death.
(2) Where there was an intent to inflict grievous bodily harm
upon another.
(3) Where the intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm upon
one person resulted in the death, not of the intended victim, but of a
third person.
Within these three categories may be grouped all the cases of in-
tentional murder at common law
II
STATUTORY INTENTIONAL MURDER
The need for a thorough revision of the Criminal law has been
recognized for many years. The present law is much the same as that
which was designed to deal with problems arising in a socaety existing
centuries ago. It is conceded, human nature being what it is, that
the problems today are of much the same nature, but the circum-
stances under which they arise are considerably different. Due to
this fact, the application of ancient law to modern crime is quite often
clumsy and gives rise to increasing demand for a modern Criminal
Code.i
3
One of the primary arguments in favor of this revision of the
Criminal Law is evident when the present state of the law of murder
is considered. Murder is perhaps the most heinous of all crimes and
is punished with the severest penalties of the law It would seem
plausible that the law regarding murder would be settled quite satis-
factorily and that at least the crime would have been defined with
judicious precision. Unfortunately, this is not the case, and the pres-
ent definition of murder is perhaps the most uncertain element in the
entire law of Crimes. This anomaly stems from the phrase "malice
"See generally; Report of the Joint Committee on the Improvement of
Criminal Justice, 56 A. B. A. REP. 513 (1931)" Gausewitz, Conszderations Basic to a
New Penal Code, I I Wis. L. RFV. 346 (1936): Pound, Toward a Better Criminal Law
21 A. B. A. J. 499 (1935).
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aforethought" which was used by the common law as the key phrase
in the definition of murder.14
The significance of the troublesome phrase, malice aforethought,
seems to have been born out of the statute of 23 Hen. VIII c. 1 see. 8.
Before this statute's enactment, the distinction in felonious homicide
between a killing with or without malice was merely nominal, both
being indiscriminately punished by death. The term "manslaughter"
was used to describe the offense in both cases. When, however, the
benefit of clergy was taken away from murders with malice prepense
by this statute, the more modern distinction between that most ag-
gravated form of homicide and the inferior grades came to be recog-
nized, so that at the period when we succeeded to the English common
law, the term malice prepense or malice aforethought was firmly en-
trenched in the definition of murder.i5
After the passage of this statute "malice aforethought" was used
in its popular sense; malice was an ill will expressmg an enmity of
heart.1" The malice was required to exist before the act which took
the life of another person, and to give expression to this idea the word
aforethought was employed. The definition of murder was, there-
fore, the unlawful killing of another with malice aforethought. How-
ever, as the common law expanded, the original meaning of malice
aforethought was altered. There came before the courts cases of
homicides for which no excuse or palliation was proved, and a large
class of cases where there was no actual intention to effect the death
of the person killed; nor was there evidence of ill will or personal
enmity The courts were faced with choosing one of two alternatives;
one was to revamp the traditional definition of murder and abandon
the phrase malice aforethought. The other was to justify a conviction
under the old definition by the employment of artificial meanings
attached to the words malice aforethought, by which they would be
made to qualify the taking of human life in all cases where sound
policy, or the demerits of the offender, required that he be subjected
to capital punishment. This change from the conventional meaning of
the phrase, to one of "art", with its resultant ramifications of "express"
and "constructive" or "implied" malice, or as it is sometimes called,
"malice in law" and "malice in fact", brought about the confusion
with which the definition of.murder now abounds.
"1CHrrY's BLACKSTONE c. 4, p. 152. Synonyms sometimes used were "malice
prepense," "malice prepensed" or merely "malice."
Note 2 supra.
"Perkins. A4 Re-examination of Malice Aforethought. 43 YALE L. J. 514
et seq (1934).
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In a criminal prosecution for murder, the defendant is entitled to
a trial by jury The jury, to be able to intelligently pass upon the inno-
cence or guilt of this defendant, must necessarily know or have for its
consideration, the definition of the crime which he is charged with
committing. Today that definition is so entwined with legal fiction
and opaque considerations that the average juror finds it difficult, if
not impossible, to determine exactly what the crime of murder con-
sists of. Therefore the law today is m the same position as it was in
1874 when Sir James Fitzjames Stephen gave his testimony before a
select committee of the British House of Commons appointed to con-
sider a Homicide Law Amendment Bill. In response to a question as
to the state of the law in regard to the definition of malice afore-
thought, the great judge replied, "My opinion is that the present
definition of malice aforethought can only mislead the jury "
Turning now to the modern murder statutes, it will be of interest
to trace their development and to attempt to reason why they were
not designed so as to bring about an orderly and exacting law or
murder.
Pennsylvania, in 1794, was the first state to make a distinct change
in the law of murder. Under English law, murder had but one pun-
ishment, and that was death. This singular punishment for all per-
sons guilty of the crime of murder seemed harsh because there were
certain acts resulting m an unlawful killing which were considered
with more disapprobation by society than were others. For example,
the same punishment was meted out to the felon who planned and
executed a diabolical murder as was given to a person who wrong-
fully cause the death of a fellow being, although at the time he had
no actual intent to kill any one. With this situation in mind, the
Pennsylvania lawmakers revised their statute of murder. The result
was a division of the crime into first degree and second degree mur-
der. The Pennsylvania Statute reads:18
"All murder that shall be perpetrated by means of poison,
or by lying in wait, or by any other land of wilful, deliberate and
premediated lklling, or which shall be committed in the perpetra-
tion of, or attempting to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, bur-
glary, or kidnapping, shall be deemed murder in the first degree, and
all other lands of murder shall be deemed murder in the second
degree.
With this statute the Pennsylvania legislature accomplished its
IL. R. A. (N. S.) 1109.
" 'A. SrFA1. title 18, sec. 2221 (1936).
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avowed purpose.19 The more heinous murders were separated and
were designated "first degree murders" in contradistinction to the
relatively less offense forms of murder which were placed in the
"second degree murder" group. An appropriate penalty was assigned
to each of the two degrees.
20
As stated in the preceding paragraph, the Pennsylvania lawmakers
accomplished their purpose. However, it seems that beyond the di-
vision of the crime into degrees, and the mtroduction of improved
phraseology, the statute took but a small step in the direction of
arranging the law of murder into a more orderly state. It did not
provide a statutory definition of the word "murder", however, the
word was used directly in the definition of both degrees. As there
was no statutory definition of murder given, it must be presumed that
the word as used in the statute had its common law connotation; i.e.,
"an unlawful killing with malice aforethought." It will be observed
that with regard to the first degree murder, this indirect inclusion of
malice aforethought has no ill effect, as the specific acts, or types of
acts, which constitute the crime are set out with particularity, and
the concept of malice aforethought is thereby circumvented. In the
second degree provision, however, there are no such specific acts, and
in order to define the crime, the definition of malice aforethought must
be employed. From this consideration of the original modern murder
statute, it can be concluded that the common law definition of mur-
der, with its malice aforethought appendage, is one of the founda-
tions upon which the majority of the present day murder statutes are
built.
The primary concern of this note is a discussion of the intentional
murder statutes of the several states. The preceding analysis of the
Pennsylvania statute concerned its full scope, but is justified because
of its wide-spread influence upon the statutory law of murder of this
country However, the remaining discussion will be limited to the
intentional murder provisions of the various statutes.
19 The preamble to the Pennsylvania Murder Statute reads; "Whereas the de-
sign of punishment is to prevent the commission of crimes, and repair the injury
that bath been done thereby to society or the individual, and it bath been found
by experience that these objects are better obtained by moderate but certain pen-
alties, than by severe and excessive punishments; And whereas it is the duty of
every government to endeavor to reform, rather than exterminate offenders, and
the punishment of death ought never to be inflicted, where it is not absolutely
necessary to the public safety " PA. LAws 1794, c. 257, sec. 1, 2. See Wechler
& Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37 COL. L. Rav. 701, 703, fn. 10
(1937).
" To the first degree offense was relegated the punishment of death or life
irmprisonment; for second degree murder the punishment was a lesser term im-
prisonment.
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The most expedient analysis of a subject as extensive as the statu-
tory intentional murder, must of necessity employ some criterion by
winch the various statutes may be grouped or classified. This distin-
guishing feature, for the purposes of this note, can best be expressed
by the following question: "Does the particular intentional murder
statute under scrutiny employ the common law conception of "malice
aforethought" in any manner, either directly or by implication?" The
application of this question to each of the intentional murder statutes
resulted in the formation of two opposing groups of statutes. As
would be expected in view of the background of all American law,
the statutes which contain some implication of the common concept
of "malice" comprise the larger of the two groups. Only ten states
have defined the crime of intentional murder without the use of terms
smacking of the common law
The thirty-eight intentional murder statutes which comprise what
will be arbitrarily termed the "Malice Group" in contradistinction to
the "Non-malice Group", are, with'the exception of the common em-
ployment of some implication of "malice", by no means heterogenous.
For this reason it is deemed advisable to further divide this large
category into sub-divisions composed of statutes which are distinctly
similar to each other. The statutes in the "Malice Group" will, there-
fore, either fall into the (1) 'Pennsylvania type", (2) "Codification
type" or (8) the "General Malice type"
(1) Pennsylvanza Type
The influence of the Pennsylvania statute has previously been
mentioned. Its principal contribution to the law of murder, the di-
vision of the crime into degrees, has been viewed with favor and
consequently adopted by all but ten of the states.2 1 The phrasing of
the statute has also been used by many states as a pattern or guide to
form the whole or part of their intentional murder provisions. The
most wide-spread adaptation of the phraesology is that which reads:
"All murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, or by
lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premedi-
tated killing, "
The entire murder statutes of nine states, as well as the intentional
murder provisions, show a very close resemblance, in both form and
"' GA. PFN. CODE 4th Div. art. 1, sec. 60 (Parks, 1914); ILL. REV. STAT. c. 38, sec.
358 (1945); Ky. R. S. sec. 435.010 (1948); LA. CODE CaIam. LAW & PRAC. ANN. art.
7410-30 (1943); ME. REV. STAT. C. 129, sec. I (1935); MIss. CODE ANN. sec. 2215 (1942);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, sec. 701 (1941); S. C. CODE ANN. sec. 1101 (1942); S. D. CODE sec.
13.2007 (1939): TL. SlAT., PEN. CODE art 1256 (1936).
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substance, to the Pennsylvania statute. For this reason they will be
classified as the Pennsylvania type intentional murder statute. Three
of these statutes are virtual reproductions of the Pennsylvania statute.
They are the statutes of Connecticut, Maryland and Vermont. 2  They
do not define murder by statute but use the word in its common law
sense m their intentional murder statutes for both the first and second
degrees. North Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia 2 3 use all the
words of the Pennsylvania statute but, in addition, employ other terms.
For example, the intentional murder statute of Virginia reads: "Murder
by poison, lying m wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing "24 North Carolina goes a
step further and adds the word "torture" to the provision for first
degree intentional murder. 25 The second degree intentional murder
m both statutes is expressed precisely as that of the Pennsylvania
statute.2 6 New Hampshire is similar to these last mentioned statutes.
It differs, however, in that it does not employ the word "wilful", but
suffices to leave "deliberate and premeditated" to describe the first
gree intentional killing. The form of the second degree intentional
murder statute is practically the same as that of the Pennsylvania
statute..2 7 The Michigan first degree provision is almost an exact re-
production of the Pennsylvania statute."8 The only distinction which
can be pointed out is that, unlike the latter, the Michigan Statute has
placed the provisions for the second degree intentional murder in a
separate paragraph..29  The Missouri murder statute is as follows:
"Every murder which shall be committed by means of
poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate,
and premeditated ldlling, and every homicide which shall be com-
mitted in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery, burglary or mayhem, shall be deemed murder in the first
degree."'
"All other kinds of murder at common law, not herein
declared to be manslaughter or justifiable or excusable homicide,
shall be deemed murder in the second degree."'
2 CONN. GEN. STAT. sec. 6043 (1930); AID. ANN. CODE GFN. Lxws art. 27, sec.
475-479 (1939): VT. PUB. LAWS sec. 8374 (1933).
2N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 14-17 (1943); VA. CoE ANN. sec. 4393 (1942):
V VA. CODE ANN. sec. 5916 (1943).
VA. CODE ANN. sec. 4393 (1942).
-N. C. GErm. STAT. ANN. sec. 14-17 (1943).
- N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. sec. 14-17 (1943); VA. CODE ANN. sec. 4393 (1942).
N. H. REv. LAws c. 455, sec. 1 (1942).
2Mici. Coup. LAWS sec. 17115-316 (Mason Cum. Supp. 1940).
21Micn. Couip. LAWS sec. 17115-317 (Mason Cum. Supp. 1940).
'1 Mo. REv. STAT. ANN sec. 4376 (1939). It is interesting to notice that in
Missouri the distinction between first and second degree intentional murder is the
word "deliberate- "wilful and premediated" are common to both degrees. See
State v. Reagan, 108 S. W 2d 391 (Mo 1937); State v. Liolios, 285 Mo. 1, 225 S. IV
941 (1920).
"1 Mo. R V. STAT. ANN, sec. 4377 (1939).
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Of the nine statutes which are classed as the "Pennsylvania type',
this Missouri statute, perhaps has less in common, both in form and
substance, with the Pennsylvania statute than any of the others. Yet,
a glance at the two in comparison will detect the marked similarity
which serves as the basis for the classification.
(2) The Codification Type
The California murder statute is in substance very similar to the
Pennsylvania statute. In fact, there is little justification for placing
this into a separate sub-division other than upon the recognition of
the form which characterizes this statute. It seems that the Cali-
fornia legislature has codified the common law Murder has been
defined by statute in terms of the common law Also, express and
implied malice have been defined as they were at common law and
placed into statutory form. Murder, however, is divided into first and
second degree. The definition of the degrees of murder is taken
directly from the Pennsylvania statute, and the only alteration is the
inclusion of the word "torture" Therefore the intentional murder
statute of California reads: "All murder which is perpetrated by
means of poison or by lying in wait, torture, or by any other kinds of
wilful, deliberate, and premediated killing , all other kinds of
murders are of the second degree."32 It will be noted that in this sta-
tute, as was true with the Pennsylvania type, the express use of the
word "malice" is not employed to describe the intentional murder.
The codified form of the California statute has attracted a consid-
erable following. Eleven states have adopted it; four almost exactly,
and the other seven with minor differentiations. The intentional
murder provisions of Arizona, Idaho and Neveda3 3 are precisely the
same as the California statute quoted above. Iowa34 fails to include
the word "torture" in the first degree statute and also makes separate
paragraphs for the first and second degrees. Other than these minor
variances, it is very similar to the California statute.
The Tennessee and Arizona murder statutes3" are a codification
of the common law They would be proper material for classification
with the California statute, in both form and substance, but for the
fact that the word "malicious" appears in the first degree intentional
murder definitions which read. "All murder which shall be perpe-
2CAi. RE v. CODE sec. 189 (1941).
"'ARIz. CODE ANN. sec. 43-2902 (1939); IDAHO CODE ANN. sec. 17-1103 (1932);
Nix. CoMip. LA ws ANN. sec. 10068 (1929).
3'IOWA CODr sec. 690.1, 690.2 (1946).
ARK. DiG. STAT. sec. 2969, 2970, (1937); TENN. CODE ANN. sec. 10768, 10769
(Williams, 1934).
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trated by means of poison or by lying in wait, or by any other kind
of wilful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing I'M
Colorado, Montana, and New Mexico 37 introduce a variation in
the intentional murder provision by expressly including the common
law doctrine of transferred intent. With this inclusion, the intentional
murder statutes read as follows:
"All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or
lying in wait, torture, or by any other kind of wilful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing , or perpetrated from a deliberate and
premeditated design, unlawfully and maliciously, to effect the death
of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the
first degree; and all other kinds of murder are of the second degree."'i
The three states, Alabama, Rhode Island, and Utah ' have the
same provision for transferred intent as do Colorado, Montana and
New Mexico. The distinction to be drawn between them is that the
former states use both "malicious" and "maliciously" in the inten-
tional murder statute. These seven last-mentioned statutes are the
first, so far, in this survey to expressly employ the word "malice" or
"malicious" in the intentional murder statute. It is submitted that the
use of the words with their common law implication of malice afore-
thought has added little or nothing to the definition of intentional
murder, or to the doctrine of transferred intent, and on the contrary
may, due to possible common law connotation and interpretation,
result in a definition so obscured by legal fiction that it will be impos-
sible for a jury to understand.
(3) The General Malice Type
The largest subdivision of the malice group is made up of sixteen
states, which are not codified and employ the word "malice", "malici-
ous" or "malice aforethought" in their definition of intentional murder.
These statutes have few other characteristics which are mutually
applicable and, therefore, offer a doubtful promise of any helpful
classification.
Indiana, Kansas, and Wyoming 40 have similar provisions in their
intentional murder statutes. Indiana and Wyoming agree that the
first degree intentional murder should be done purposely and with
Ibid.
gCoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 48 sec. 32 (1935); Mo %r. R,'. Cooms ANN. 10955 (1935);
N. M. STAT. ANN. sec. 41-2404 (1941).
3Ibzd.
ALA. COzL ANN. tit. 14, sec. 314 (1941); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 606, sec. 1 (1938):
UTAH CODE ANN. sec. 28-3 (1943).
4 IND. ANN. STAT. sec. 10-3401 (Burns, 1942): KAN. GCN. STAr. ANN. sec. 21.401
(1935); Wyo. Covs. STAT. AN. sec. 9-201 (1945).
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premeditated malice. Kansas' first degree statute is similar to the
Pennsylvania type, but the second degree uses the words " pur-
posely and maliciously, but without deliberation and premedita-
tion " to describe the crime.
4 1
Intentional first degree murder m either Oregon or Nebraska -4 2 is
defined: "If any person shall purposely, and of deliberate and pre-
meditated malice, kill another " The second degree re-
quires that the killing shall be done " purposely and maliciously,
but without deliberation and premeditation."
4 3
The Ohio statute provides that "Whosoever purposely, and either
of deliberate and premeditated malice, or by means of poison " is
guilty of first degree intentional murder.4 4 This state does not follow
the common law; the intentional murder statute, however, is similar
in effect and content to the statutes of the common law states.
The definition of the intentional murder, as provided by the Code
of the District of Columbia, 5 is quite similar to that of Ohio. It in-
volves a "purposeful killing" also, and the District of Columbia Courts
have held much the same as those in Ohio in regard to the require-
ment of an actual intent to kill for the crime of first degree intentional
murder. Implied malice constitutes murder only in the second
degree.4"' The second dergee intentional murder for this jurisdiction is
defined: "Whoever with malice aforethought kills another, is
guilty of murder in the second degree."47 The distinction between the
first and second degrees is based upon actual intent, as well as delib-
eration and premeditation.
The eight states remaining to be discussed in this category exem-
plify the least divergence from the common law The Kentucky
statute goes no further than to assign the punishment for "Any person
who commits wilful murder "48 The courts of South Carolina
have held that their statute, which defines murder in common law
terms, does not even make murder a statutory offense.49  Neither
Kentucky nor South Carolina has divided the crime into degrees.
Massachusetts defines first degree intentional murder as follows:
,1 KAN. GrN. STAT. ANN. sec. 21.402 (1935).
I,,NF . Ri v. Sr,\. sec. 28-401 (1929): ORE. Couriw. LAWS A\NN. sec. 23-401 (1939).
"Ni %. Rt v. STAT. Sec. 28-402 (1929); ORE. Comi. Liws ANN. sec. 23-402 (1939).
"Oiio GI N. Conr ANN. sec. 12400 (Page, 1939).
D. C. Comr sec. 22-2401 (1940).
"Sabens v. U. S.. 40 App. D. C. 440 (1913).
1 D. C. CoDE sec. 22-2402 (1940).
" M. R. S. sec. 135.010 (1948).
'S. C. CorE AN. sec. 1101 (1942): State v. Bowers, 65 S. C. 207, 43 S. E.
656 (1903).
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"Murder committed with deliberately premeditated malice afore-
thought ,,5o This is distinguished from the second degree "-, by
the words "deliberately premeditated." The Delaware Code makes a
similar provision, but substitutes "express malice aforethought" for
deliberately premeditated malice aforethought. 
2
The Maine, Illinois, and Georgia statutes are similar and provide
little more than the common law definition of murder.53 The Georgia
Penal Code makes the following provision which typifies all three
statutes: "Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being in the
peace of the state, by a person of sound memory and discretion, with
malice aforethought, either express or implied."54 The Illinois statutes
define express malice as " that deliberate intention unlawfully to
take the life of a fellow creature 53
The Texas statute reqires that the intentional murder be com-
mitted "voluntarily" and in " the absence of circumstances which
reduce the offense to negligent homicide or which excuse or justify
the killing."56 This otherwise admirable definition of the offense is
marred by a subsequent provision that in any murder trial the court
will define "malice aforethought" for the jury 5 7 As has been pointed
out previously in this note, such a task is practically impossible.
The second of the two principal groups into which the forty-eight
intentional murder statutes have been divided contain ten states and
is designated the "Non-malice Group." The basis upon which they
are classified together is that they do not employ, either expressly or
by any implication, the common law concept of "malice." The argu-
ment as to why this is an admirable characteristic has been set out
previously, and will not be reiterated here.
The intentional murder statute of New York is perhaps the best
illustration of pure statutory murder which eschews the phraseology
of the common law Tins statute reads as follows:
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or
justifiable, is murder in the first degree when committed:
1. From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect
the death of the person killed, or of another; or
r'MAss. GEN. LAws c. 265, sec. 1 (1932).
-1 Ibid.
- DEL. REV. CODE sec. 5157 (1935).
F- GA. PEN. CODE 4th Div. art. 1, sec. 60 (Parks, 1914); ILL. REv. STAr. c. 38, sec.
358 (1945): ME. REV. STAT. C. 129, sec. 1 (1935).
" GA. PEN. CODE 4th Div. art. 1 sec. 60 (Parks, 1914).
" ILL. REV. STAT. C. 38, sec. 358 (1945).
TEX. STAT., PEN. CODE art. 1256 (1936).
1 TEx. STAT., PEN. CODE art. 1257b (1936).
s N. Y. PEN. LAW sec. 1044 (Thompson, 1937).
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The second degree intentional murder is a" killing of a human
being when committed with a design to effect the death of the
person killed, or of another, but without deliberation and premedi-
tation."-' The phrase, "deliberate and premeditated design" was
chosen for the purpose of expressing m words a juryman could under-
stand, the state of mind required for an actor to be guilty of first
gree intentional murder. That they were well chosen, must be con-
ceded after a glance at the dictionary; a "deliberate design" expressed
in terms of dictionary definitions reads as follows: "A plan, formed in
the mind, of something to be done or produced, and arrived at, or
determined upon, as a result of careful thought and weighing of con-
siderations." " Add to this the further requisite of "premeditation," as
understood by the average juror, and he should have a satisfactory
idea as to what he must find present in the facts of the case m order
to convict a prisoner of first degree intentional murder. This use of
words in a statute which mean exactly what the jury would ordinarily
think they mean, is superior to the use of words which, when defined
as used in the law, have little or no resemblance to their natural or
literal meanings.
Many courts have had a tendency to adopt a rather strained de-
finition of the word "premeditation," at least from the layman's point
of view This may stem from the fact that "premeditation" and
"aforethought" are so closely associated in natural meaning that these
courts have allowed themselves to apply some aspects of the common
law definition of "aforethought" to that of "premeditation." The result
of this tendency is to change the ordinary definition of premeditation
so that, at law, a killing would be "premeditated" if the intent to kill
was formed simultaneously with the act which produced the death.';
This consideration may have influenced the legislature of Mis-
sissippi when it drew up their intentional murder statute. The word
"premeditated" is not used in the statute, which defines the intentional
murder as:
"The killing of a human being, without the authority of
law, by any means or in any manner, shall be murder in the fol-
lowing cases:
(a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death
of the person killed, or of any human being; "1'
The New York statute's employment of the word "deliberate" in
N. Y. PEN. LAW sec. 1046 (Thompson, 1937).
rXVrBSriR'S NEW Ir RNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1944).
"'State v. Smith, 49 Conn. 376 (1881); People v. Cunningham, 6 Parker Cr. R.
398 (N. Y. 1864).
'-'Miss. Comr ANN. sec. 2215 (1942). Mississippi has no degrees of murder.
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addition to "premeditated" serves as a useful guard against the pos-
sibility of any unlawful intentional killing becoming murder in the first
degree.
Statutes of the six states of Florida, Minnesota, Oklahoma, South
Dakota, Washington and Wisconsin 3 are similar to the New York
statute, the principal diference being that the word "deliberate" is not
used to supplement "premeditated." The first degree intentional mur-
der provision of Washington is typical:
"The killing of a human being is murder in the
first degree when committed either-
(1) With a premeditated design to effect the death of
the person killed, or of another 244
"The killing of a human being is murder m the
second degree when-
(1) Committed with a design to effect the death of the
person killed or of another, but without premeditation; "a
In the Minnesota statute, this omission of "deliberate" in the first
degree provision is partially remedied by the second degree statute.
The intentional killing is second degree murder if done" without
deliberation and premeditation "6 This, by irdirection, makes
deliberation as well as premeditation a requisite of first degree inten-
tional murder.
The three statutes remaining to be discussed in the Non-malice
Group have certain objectionable features, which may be pointed out
here. The New Jersey intentional murder statute, 6 at first blush,
would be classed as a Pennsylvania Type statute. The provisions for
the intentional murder in the two statutes are identical in form. How-
ever, the word "murder," as used in the New Jersey statute, has been
given a statutory definition in terms which avoid the use of implication
of "malice aforethought." The word "murder" as employed by the
Pennsylvania statute is used in its common law sense. The advantage
gained by the abolition of common law terminology in the New Jersey
definition of murder was lost, however, because this dfinition was
made up of a lengthy list of specific situations, each of which would be
murder if the killing were committed under that particular set of
circumstances. 68 Thus, the definition is overburdened with particular-
'FLA. STAT. sec. 782.04 (1941); INN. SirT. sec. 619.07. 619.08 (1945); OKLA.
STAT. ut. 21, sec. 701 (1941); S. D. CODE sec. 13.2007 (1939): WAsH. RFv. STAT. ANN.
sec. 2392, 2393 (1932); Wis. STAT. sec. 340.02 (1943).
1 WAsH. REv. STAr. ANN. sec. 2392 (1932).
6Ild., sec. 2393.
6O MINN. STAr. sec. 619.08 (1945).
"N. J. Rrv. STAT. sec. 2:138-2 (1937).
"N. J. REV. STAT. sec. 2:138-1 (1937).
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ity, which may result in an undesirable rigidity and lack of flexibility
necessary to meet new situations which might well arise. As this
word "murder" is incorprated directly in the first degree intentional
murder statute, and indirectly in the second, their desirability and effi-
ciency are accordingly reduced.
The objection to the North Dakota intentional murder statute69 is
that, on its face, it fails to provide for an intentional killing which was
committed without any deliberation or premeditation. To begin with,
the statutory definition of murder is as follows:
"Homicide is murder in the following cases:
1. When perpetrated without authority of law and with a
premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of
any other human being ,o
Two other provisions within this definition include the negligent
murder and the felony murder. The crime of murder is then divided
into degrees:
"The intentional murder is 'Every murder perpetrated by
means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by torture, or by other wilful,
deliberate or premeditated killing is murder in the first degree.
All other kinds of murder are murder in the second degree.' "
A glance at the statutory definition of murder will show that any
killing which is to be regarded as murder, either in the first or the
second degree, must by the express terms of that definition, be a pre-
meditated killing. From this it seems to follow that any intentional
killing which is not premeditated, will fall under the provisions of the
manslaughter statute- "Homicide, not excusable or justifiable but
perpetrated in a manner not constituting murder, is manslaughter."
72
The criticism of the Louisiana statute is directed toward the fact
that it omits the possibility that an intentional homicide could occur
under such circumstances as to make it excusable or justifiable. The
statute reads, "Murder is the killing of a human being, (1) when the
offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm;
or "73 Thus, a person who in self-defense, kills another with a
"specific intent" to do so, even though justified in his actions, would
presumably also meet the requirements for a murderer, as set out in
the intentional murder statute. Admittedly, this defect can be, and
is, remedied by the court's instructions and rulings upon the trial, but
it is suggested, in view of the fact that there are no degrees of murder
'l N. D. REV. CODE sec. 12-2712 (1943).
'IN. D. REV. CODE sec. 12-2708 (1) (1943).
1 Note 59 supra.
'IN. D. REV. CoDnE sec. 12-2715 (1943).
-L%. CODy. CRIM. LAW & PRAc. ANN. art. 7-10-30 (1943).
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in Louisiana, and the single punishment for murder is death, that the
statute could have been worded so as to clearly except excusable and
justifiable intentional killings.
The foregoing survey of the forty-eight intentional murder statutes
may be employed as an aid in the drawing up of a suggested model
intentional murder statute. The statutes which have embodied some
use or implication of common law "malice aforethought" will, for
reasons presented above in the discussion of the statutes, not be con-
sidered as desirable precedent for this model statute. Of the ten states
which have not embodied the concept of "malice" in the phrasing of
their intentional murder statutes, New York seems to approach nearest
to what, m the opinion of the writer, such a statute should be and con-
tam. The crime is separated into two degrees, a characteristic in-
herited from the original Pennsylvama statute. It is defined in general
terms which gives the statute elasticity essential to enable it to con-
tain new acts, resulting in intentional killings not heretofore dealt with
by law Finally, and probably most outstanding, the words used to
describe the crime are defined by both the law and the man on the
street in precisely the same manner. Therefore the definition of in-
tentional murder is open to immediate understanding by the average
juror and will result in a more intelligent and efficient consideration by
him of the guilt or innocence of the accused on the facts in the case.
The New York statute, therefore, is the pattern from which is cut
the following model intentional murder statute. The reader will
notice that the only alteration in the New York statute suggested by
the writer is the preface to the second degree provision.
This suggested intentional murder statute is set out here as a model
designed to accomplish speedy justice and to dispense with many of the
undesirable characteristics of the common law definition of intentional
murder-
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or
justifiable, is murder in the first degree when committed:
1. From a deliberate and premeditated design to effect
the death of the person killed, or of another; or
"The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or
justifiable, is murder in the second degree when committed:
1. From a design to effect the death of the person killed,
or of another, but without deliberation and premeditation."
A. SINGLETON CAGLE
